Fāṭimid-Būyid Diplomacy During the Reign of Al-Azīz billāh * (365/975-386/996)

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Abstract

It is a coincidence of history that perhaps the greatest sovereign of the Fatimid dynasty, al-‘Aziz billāh, and the most powerful representative of Buyid rule, ‘Aḍud al-Dawla, were contemporaries. It was in the time of these two great rulers that Fatimid-Buyid diplomacy reached its high watermark. This article seeks to examine the reasons for the inception and termination of diplomacy between these two powers.

Keywords

Fatimid, Buyid, initiation of diplomacy, Abd al-Dawla, al-Aziz, strengthening Buyid rule, terminating the alliance

Introduction

The emergence of the Fāṭimids in North Africa ushered in a major revolution in the Islamic world. For the first time in Muslim annals, there were two rival caliphates, the active and expanding caliphate of the Fāṭimids and the waning authority of the ‘Abbāsids of Baghdad, effectively controlled by their Būyid protectors. When the Fāṭimids moved east to Egypt (in 358/969), interaction between these two caliphates became inevitable.

It is a coincidence of history that perhaps the greatest sovereign of the Fāṭimid dynasty, al-‘Aziz billāh, and the most powerful representative of Buyid rule, ‘Aḍud al-Dawla (338/944-372/983), were contemporaries. It was in the time of these two great rulers that Fāṭimid- Būyid diplomacy reached its high-water mark. Prior to ‘Aḍud al-Dawla's appearance on the political scene at Baghdad and after his departure from it, the other Būyid amīrs were too involved in interfamilial strife to have any contact – friendly or otherwise - with the Fāṭimid ruler al-‘Azīz.

An examination of the sources on Fāṭimid- Būyid diplomacy during the reign of al-‘Azīz billāh reveals certain discrepancies in the information they provide. Consequently, they raise certain important questions as to the need for diplomacy between the two powers in the first place and the subsequent termination of relations between them. This article seeks to discuss these issues.

Exchange of embassies

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The first recorded instance of diplomacy between al-'Azīz and `Aḍud al-Dawla is to be found in a letter the Būyid ruler supposedly wrote to his Fāṭimid counterpart c. 367/8-977-8. Unfortunately, this letter does not seem to have been preserved in its entirety by any of the extant sources. Ibn Taghrī Birdī, however, gives a summary of its contents. He says:

`Aḍud al-Dawla had written a letter to him [i.e. al-`Azīz] acknowledging in it the excellence of the ahl al-bait and confirming to al-`Azīz that he [i.e. al-`Azīz] was from that pure source. He addressed him [i.e. al-`Azīz] as al-ḥāḍrat al-shārīfa and words to that effect.¹

The gist of the letter that `Aḍud al-Dawla wrote to al-`Azīz can also be ascertained from al-`Azīz's reply to it which arrived at the Būyid court in 369/979-80.² Fortunately, Ibn Taghrī Birdī has reproduced this letter of al-`Azīz in far greater detail than that of the Būyid amīr. He says:³

... his [i.e. al-`Azīz's] letter to `Aḍud al-Dawla who was in the company of the 'Abbāsid Caliph al-Tāʾī指向 his [i.e. al-`Azīz's] merit and strength. The contents of the letter, after the basmala were [as follows]: 'From the slave and wālī [friend] of Allāh, Nizār Abī l-Manṣūr al-Imām al-`Azīz billāh Amīr al-Muʾminīn to `Aḍud al-Dawla, al-Imām the protector of the mina [community] of Islam, Abī Shuja‘ b. Abī `Alī, greetings to you. The Amīr al-Muʾminīn praises Allāh - there is no god but He - to you and asks Him to bless his [i.e. al-`Azīz's] forefather Muḥammad, the messenger of the Lord of both worlds and the proof of Allāh for all creation, continuous, increasing and everlasting prayers through his right guiding, pious and pure progeny.

And now to our subject: Your envoy has come in the presence of the Amīr al-Muʾminīn with the messenger sent to you. He has reported what he was to convey of your sincerity concerning loyalty to the Amīr al-Muʾminīn, your friendship and your acknowledgement of his right to the imāma and your love towards his pious and rightly guided forefathers. The Amīr al-Muʾminīn has been pleased with what he has heard from you and it was in accordance with what he has come to expect of you. You do not deviate from the truth.' Then he said many words in the same vein until he said: 'I have found out what has happened at the Muslims' borders at the hands of the Polytheists and the destruction of al-Shām, the weakening of its people and the rise in prices. If that was not the case, the Amīr al-Muʾminīn would personally march to the thughūr [borders]. He will go to al-Hīrā.⁴ His letter will come to you shortly. So prepare for jihād [holy war] in the path of Allāh.

Both the précis of `Aḍud al-Dawla's letter and al-`Azīz's reply to it offer valuable information on the nature of diplomacy between the two powerful dynasts of the medieval Muslim world. They also offer interesting insights into the terms of negotiation between the two rulers.

According to Ibn Taghrī Birdī, `Aḍud al-Dawla acknowledged in his letter the excellence of the ahl al-bait and affirmed that al-`Azīz was 'from that pure source'. Moreover, he addressed the Fāṭimid ruler as al-ḥāḍrat al-shārīfa. This appellation, that the Būyid amīr uses to address his Fāṭimid counterpart, clearly denotes his acceptance of the Fāṭimid sovereign as a descendant of `Alī b. Abī Ṭālib.⁵
These sentiments of 'Aḍud al-Dawla are further confirmed in al-'Azīz's reply to the Būyid ruler. After the *basma* (the usual opening of a letter) al-'Azīz thanks the Būyid amīr for 'the sincerity and loyalty to the *Amīr al-Mu'minīn* [i.e. al-'Azīz], your friendship, your acknowledgement of his right to the *imām* and your love towards his pious ... ancestors'. He adds that he is pleased with what 'Aḍud al-Dawla has to say about him and his progeny and that it is in conformity with what he expects from the Būyid amīr.

The military manoeuvres of the Byzantine forces on the borderlands of the Muslims appear to be a matter of particular import to the Fāṭimid ruler. Accordingly, he expresses his disapproval of the suffering meted out to the Muslims of the *thughūr* (Muslim-Byzantine frontier) by Byzantium. He then urges the Būyid ruler to join him in a *jihād* which he intends to undertake personally against the Byzantine forces in retaliation for the havoc which they have caused in al-Shām.

'Aḍud al-Dawla's response to the above dispatch of al-'Azīz has been preserved in a *tadhkira* (memo) addressed to the Būyid envoy, al-Qādī Abū Muḥammad al-'Ummānī, who was to accompany the Fāṭimid emissary Abu'l-Walīd 'Utba b. al-Walīd to the Fāṭimid court. Cahen has edited this memo from a collection of Būyid documents which Hilāl al-Ṣabī incorporated in one of his works. As the memo has already been translated into French by Cahen, it has been thought unnecessary here to retranslate it into English. In view of its importance, however, a detailed analysis of its contents has been undertaken below.

The earlier part of the memo is characterized by the same kind of respectful tones denoting the noble ancestry of al-'Azīz as are found in the Būyid amīr's previous correspondence. It praises al-Azīz's outstanding merit, generosity, friendship, and goodwill. 'Aḍud al-Dawla then states that the dispatches of the Fāṭimid sovereign do not offer clear evidence of peaceful relations, friendship, and fulfilment of promises that the Būyid amīr expected from him. He therefore urges his envoy, al-Qādī al-'Ummānī, to take up these issues with al-'Azīz and seek clarification for them. We are left in the dark as regards the exact terms of conciliation that the Būyid ruler was seeking from his Fāṭimid counterpart. These were probably transmitted orally, for it is quite clear in the text of the letters themselves that they were to be accompanied by oral messages. In their letters, both al-'Azīz and 'Aḍud al-Dawla instruct their envoys to take up certain issues in person with the respective sovereigns.

The Būyid amīr continues by confirming vehemently the need to wage a *jihād* against the enemies of Allāh, the Byzantines. However, he makes his co-operation on the matter with the Fāṭimid sovereign conditional on the latter's fulfilment of his 'demanded conditions of friendship, obligation of trust and peaceful affairs'. 'Aḍud al-Dawla then refers to the activities of the *Ismā'īlī dā'īs* in his realm. He confirms that the dā'īs can continue propagating their message. The dā'īs of al-BAṣrā are an exception to the above ruling, however, for they have transgressed their limits. He then gives instructions to the Qādī to deal with this matter upon his return from the Fāṭimid court.

'Aḍud al-Dawla then alludes to an 'Uqailī with whom he disclaims any ties of friendship and, in fact, repudiates him. It is quite possible that al-'Azīz may have questioned 'Aḍud al-
Dawla’s involvement in the desertion of the Banū ‘Uqail at a critical juncture of the battle which resulted in the defeat and death of one of ‘Aḍud al-Dawa’s avowed enemies and a protégé of the Fāṭimid – the Ḥamdānid Abū Taglib.9

Finally, the Būyid amīr makes a vague reference to the hijriyyūn, assuring that he will fulfil his promises to them, provided his conditions of ‘agreement and friendship’ are complied with. Cahen remarks that he knows of ‘no text that explains what this is about’.10 It may well be a reference to one of Bakhtiyār’s brothers and a cousin of ‘Aḍud al-Dawla, Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm and his entourage, who had eventually taken refuge in Egypt after suffering at the hands of ‘Aḍud al-Dawla in 367/977.11 Either their safe return to the Būyid court without being persecuted by ‘Aḍud al-Dawla or their being kept away from it, as suggested by Būsse,12 could well have been a matter of negotiations between the two powers.

**Proposed confrontation and subsequent breakdown of relations**

The next reference to Fāṭimid- Būyid relations is to be found in the year 369/979. Historians report the aggressive designs of ‘Aḍud al-Dawla against al-Shām – where the Fāṭimidids were involved in gaining ascendancy over other powers, and against Egypt – the very base of Fāṭimid power.13 Curiously enough, that was the very year in which the above-mentioned Fāṭimid embassy had arrived at the Būyid court and had returned to Cairo with the Būyid amīr’s emissary.14 According to the sources, the main obstacle that held ‘Aḍud al-Dawla back from marching to Syria and then Egypt was the eruption of hostilities between him and his brother Fakhr al-Dawla. ‘Aḍud al-Dawla was consequently compelled to divert his energies and resources to deal militarily with his brother first.15

The diplomatic negotiations between the two powers appear to have come to a complete full stop. In Ǧaḥr 371/August 981 al-‘Azīz is reported to have hired a henchman to spirit away a silver lion which was placed on top of the zabzab (a pectoral in the shape of a boat), belonging to ‘Aḍud al-Dawla.16 This zabzab formed part of the royal emblems of ‘Aḍud al-Dawla and by having it stolen the Fāṭimid sovereign was ridiculing the Būyid ruler's authority, pride, and alertness.17

‘Aḍud al-Dawla appears to have retaliated by sending spies to the Fāṭimid capital and inspiring awe among the people there. Under the year 372/982-3 al-Rudhrāwārī reports at length the tale of a confectioner in Cairo who refused to accept a Būyid coin in payment for some confectionery that one of the men working for ‘Aḍud al-Dawla had purchased. Further, the confectioner is reported to have abused the Būyid amīr. When the matter was reported to ‘Aḍud al-Dawla, he secured the presence of the confectioner at his court and severely reprimanded him. The Būyid amīr then let him return to Cairo on condition that he would never repeat the offence. Al-Rudhrāwārī ends the report by saying that the confectioner's story became well known in Cairo. As a result, the people there refrained from mentioning ‘Aḍud al-Dawla.18

**The issue of genealogy**

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To my knowledge, Ibn Zāfir's *kitāb akhbaar al-duval al-munqati'ā* is the only source which offers an explanation for the deterioration of Fāṭimid- Būyid relations. It places the blame squarely on the issue of Fāṭimid genealogy. Ibn Zāfir reports that `Aḍud al-Dawla had supposedly questioned the Fāṭimid ruler on his true genealogy. As he was not quite satisfied with the Fāṭimid response, he had subsequently threatened to attack Fāṭimid lands.

The Būyid amīr is also supposed to have questioned the `Alīds of Iraq on the matter of the genealogy of the Fāṭimids. In response to the Būyid amīr's persistent enquiries, al-`Azīz, in consultation with his vizier Ya`qūb b. Killis, supposedly had a genealogy prepared, linking himself to Muḥammad b. Ismā`īl - a lineal descendant of `Alī b. Abī Tālib. The genealogy thus prepared was apparently to be sent to Baghdad with the Būyid envoy. This envoy did not reach the Būyid court, however, for he was murdered at Tripoli by a Fāṭimid envoy who had accompanied him.

Ibn Zāfir contends that the Fāṭimids hoped by their above action to spread their genealogy in the various countries. He claims further that according to the Fāṭimids the genealogy did not reach Baghdad because of the death of the Būyid envoy and not because it was false.

If `Aḍud al-Dawla did question the genuineness of the Fāṭimid descent from 'Alī b. Abī Tālib, that is not evident from the extant correspondence exchanged between him and al-`Azīz. On the contrary, in the written correspondence `Aḍud al-Dawla clearly acknowledges the `Alīd descent of the Fāṭimids. It could be argued that the Būyid amīr may have questioned Fāṭimid genealogy in the oral messages that accompanied the letters. If that were the case, though, it is surprising that the Būyid amīr should have felt the need to assent to these claims, and indeed to reiterate them, in the letters themselves. He could just as well have omitted them. It is possible that the issue of genealogy may have been raised in later dispatches between the two rulers. However, that appears highly improbable as the sources are totally silent in the matter.

What can be clearly concluded from the events as they have unfolded so far is that Fāṭimid-Būyid relations began on very amicable terms c. 367/977-8, but within a span of three years, that is by the year 371/981, they had deteriorated completely. The question then arises as to what were the reasons that may have prompted the most powerful of all Būyid amīrs, `Aḍud al-Dawla, to enter into negotiations with his Fāṭimid counterpart, al-`Azīz, in the first instance.

**Būyid acceptance of `Alīd descent of the Fāṭimids**

Perhaps an answer to the above question lies in the supposed 'temporary' acceptance of the Fāṭimid claims of `Alīd descent by the Būyid `Aḍud al-Dawla. It must be borne in mind that both the Fāṭimids and the Būyids belonged to different denominations of the Shi`i branch of Islam. The Fāṭimids asserted themselves as Imāms of the Isma`ilis while the Būyid's were either of Zaydī or Ithnā `Asharī persuasion. Moreover, as the claimed descendants of `Alī b. Abī Tālib and the Prophet's daughter Fatima, the Fāṭimids presented themselves as the legitimate political as well as spiritual leaders of the Shi`a in general, embodying all its hitherto unfulfilled hopes and aspirations.

The Būyids, on the other hand, made no claims to religious authority for themselves. In fact, most of them do not appear to have been very zealous about their religious beliefs. It follows that, had the
Būyid amīr chosen to accept the Fāṭimid as the descendants of `Alī b. Abī Tālib and consequently the legitimate Imāms, they would then necessarily have had to bow to their authority in religious as well as political matters.

It is noteworthy that the Būyids, being Shi‘a, did not replace the Sunnī `Abbāsīd Caliph with a Shi‘īte one. However, as Kennedy has pointed out, the Būyid amīrs faced the same problems as any ruler who wished to establish an `Alīd caliphate. If the Būyids were twelver Shi‘a, then they acknowledged that their last Imām had gone into occultation some seventy years earlier, while if they were Zaydīs, then the only Imām whose leadership could be accepted as valid had to be a descendant of al-Ḥusain or al-Ḥasan, who had secured power for himself by his own efforts.22

In any case, the first Būyid ruler over Iraq, Mu‘izz al-Dawla, contemplated appointing an `Alīd to the caliphate after he had deposed the reigning `Abbāsīd Caliph al-Mustakfī in 334/945. He was persuaded to abandon the idea by his vizier al-Saimārī who pointed out to him that an `Alīd Caliph whose claims were accepted as valid would have greater authority than the Būyid amīr himself.23 Moreover, as relative outsiders in the Islamic world, and with no real claims to nobility, the Būyids could not afford to throw off the yoke of legitimacy which the `Abbāsīd caliphate embodied without facing repercussions with which they were not yet powerful enough to cope.

All things considered then, it is difficult to imagine that an astute and ambitious politician of the stature of `Aḍud al-Dawla would place himself under an Ismā‘īlī Imām out of choice. Furthermore, by maintaining the nominal authority of the Sunnī `Abbāsīd Caliph, `Aḍud al-Dawla placated the majority of his subjects who were Sunnī. Hence the acceptance that the Fāṭimid belonged to the progeny of the ahl al-bait does not at all appear to be in the interests of the Būyid amīr. Conversely, recognition of Fāṭimid claims by the mighty `Aḍud al-Dawla would certainly have been most prestigious for the Fāṭimid al-`Azīz.

In keeping with his views on kingship and the vesting of total authority in the shāhanshāh (king of kings) - that is, himself - `Aḍud al-Dawla may have contemplated using his supposed allegiance to the Fāṭimid Caliph as a threat to the total annulment of the `Abbāsīd caliphate. In this way he may have compelled the `Abbāsīd Caliph to accept the supreme position of the Būyid amīr, with the Caliph being a mere figurehead.24 There is ample evidence that upon his accession to power at Baghdad, `Aḍud al-Dawla made the `Abbāsīd Caliph grant him unprecedented honours and powers.25

However, the very fact that `Aḍud al-Dawla was desirous and capable of exercising total authority in his domains makes his overtures to the Fāṭimids all the more strange, for that would undoubtedly place him in a subsidiary position vis-à-vis the Fāṭimid ruler.

If, on the other hand, the motives of `Aḍud al-Dawla for courting the Fāṭimid Caliph were based purely on the grounds of gaining legitimacy for his own rule, then the position of the `Abbāsīd Caliph as the religious head of the Sunnī world, yet possessing very little secular power, appears to be a much more suitable choice than that of the politically and religiously virile Fāṭimid Caliph. The answer to the question posed above as to the Būyid amīr's need to initiate diplomacy with his Fāṭimid counterpart has then to be sought elsewhere.
Most sources are reticent on the issue of the overtures made by `Aḍud al-Dawla to al-ʿAzīz. Ibn Taḥrīr Bīrī finds it most astonishing that `Aḍud al-Dawla began communications with al-ʿAzīz. What he offers by way of explanation `Aḍud provides a clue, however, to the Būyid amīr's possible reasons for doing so. He states that `Aḍud al-Dawla only corresponded with al-ʿAzīz because of his inability to oppose him.26 This chance remark of Ibn Taḥrīr Bīrī also sheds interesting light on the historiographical aspects of the issue of Fāṭimid-Būyid diplomacy at this time.

**Historiographical aspects**

It is rather curious that although Hilāl al-Ṣābī, the court historian of the Būyids, is the original source of information on the overtures of `Aḍud al-Dawla to al-ʿAzīz as well as the latter's response to the Būyid amīr, subsequent historians of the Būyid court, such as Ibn Miskawaih and al-Rudhrāwārī, significantly underplay the issue of the wooing of al-ʿAzīz by `Aḍud al-Dawla. Nonetheless, they rely considerably on Hilāl al-Ṣābī for other information.27

So marked is the omission on the part of these historians that not a trace of it is to be found in either of their works except a mention in passing by Ibn Miskawaih that an embassy arrived from the ruler of the west (i.e. Egypt) at the Būyid court in Shaʿbān 369/February-March 986, and that it left in Dhū l-Qaʿda/May of the same year.28 Not a word is said about the contents of the message brought by the Fāṭimid envoy nor the fact that his embassy was sent in response to the one dispatched by the Būyid amīr to the Fāṭimid court earlier.

Under that very year Ibn Miskawaih also mentions that, after `Aḍud al-Dawla had overpowered all his real and potential enemies, 'his thoughts were redirected to the conquest of Egypt especially, and after that to the territory of the unbelievers, the Byzantines and such as lie beyond them'.29 Although Ibn Miskawaih then states that `Aḍud al-Dawla had by this time dropped his intention of marching against Egypt, he does not state at this point - or for that matter earlier on in the work - when `Aḍud al-Dawla had initially resolved to wage war against Egypt. It is the latter historians such as Ibn Taḥrīr Bīrī and Ibn Zāfir who, deriving their information either directly or indirectly from Hilāl al-Ṣābī, discuss the issue of the initial attempts by `Aḍud al-Dawla to court the Fāṭimid amīr to the Fāṭimid court earlier.

This deliberate attempt at suppressing information on the part of Būyid court historians such as Ibn Miskawaih and al-Rudhrāwārī may well be due to the fact that, writing as they were in the heyday of the mighty `Aḍud al-Dawla, they, as well as their patron, may have wished to blot out any memories of actions that the Būyid amīr may have taken in his moments of weakness, during the earlier part of his reign. The unusually friendly advances to al-ʿAzīz on the part of `Aḍud al-Dawla would certainly appear to lend weight to such an interpretation.

**The interest of `Aḍud al-Dawla vis-à-vis the Fāṭimids in al-Sham**

As Cahen has pointed out, it was inevitable that two expansionist dynasties like the Fāṭimids and the Būyids would clash, as they were both aiming at the domination of common territories-those that lay between Iraq and Egypt.30 This was particularly true of the militarily active times of al-ʿAzīz and `Aḍud al-Dawla.
The Būyid amīr turned his attention to al-Shām soon after his accession to power at Baghdad. The interest shown by ʿAḍud al-Dawla in al-Shām sprang from the interlinked considerations of politics and commerce. Politically al-Shām at this time was in a fragmented state. The Fāṭimids were successful only from time to time in asserting their authority over the central and southern parts of the country, whilst its northern territories were either under direct Byzantine rule or at least under its nominal tutelage: the Ḥamdānids of Aleppo were one such dynasty. In relative terms, then, al-Shām was free to be taken by anyone who felt powerful enough to exert his authority in the region.

For ʿAḍud al-Dawla, the commercial advantages of controlling parts of al-Shām were clearly evident. The years of misrule over Iraq by his cousin and predecessor Bakhtiyār ʿIzz al-Dawla had left the country's commerce as well as agriculture in total disarray. Predictably the economic situation in Iraq was on the verge of total collapse when ʿAḍud al-Dawla took over as the next Būyid amīr. Undoubtedly, therefore, one of the very first concerns of ʿAḍud al-Dawla was to look for alternative sources of revenue to supplement the depleted economy of Iraq. The various towns of al-Shām - with its centres of commerce and trading, and its considerable agricultural output - must certainly have appeared to the Būyid amīr as a suitable source of desperately needed revenues.

Moreover, since the Fāṭimids had conquered Egypt, they had endeavoured and largely succeeded in diverting trade from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. This had dealt a further blow to the Iraqi economy. If, on the other hand, ʿAḍud al-Dawla managed to secure a foothold in some of the coastal towns of al-Shām - such as Tripoli, which formed part of this newly established, thriving trade route - he would stand to benefit considerably from it.

Another significant problem from the reign of ʿIzz al-Dawla with which ʿAḍud al-Dawla had to grapple was the total mistrust and enmity between the two major blocks of the armed forces - the Turks and the Dailamis. Channelling this divided force's energies into fighting a war in a foreign territory would certainly be a constructive and profitable manner of dealing - at least temporarily - with them.

It could be argued that ʿAḍud al-Dawla could just as well have diverted his energies eastwards towards the lucrative lands of Khuraṣān - then under the Sāmānids. There were a number of factors that deterred him from doing so, however, not the least of them being the fact that the Sāmānids were still a considerable force to be reckoned with in his own time. Moreover, in the earlier stages of his career at Baghdad, the Būyid amīr lacked both the resources and the manpower that challenging the Sāmānids would entail.

It must also be borne in mind that in 342/955-6, during the reign of Rukn al-Dawla, the Būyids had been forced to sign a humiliating peace treaty with the Sāmānids according to which they would pay tribute to the latter. Although the treaty had been revised to terms that were more favourable to the Būyids, nonetheless this treaty was still valid in the time of ʿAḍud al-Dawla. By this time, however, the main clause of the treaty was that neither of the two parties would encroach upon the other's territories. This was seen to be in the mutual interest of both the dynasties. Al-Shām, then, would have appeared a far more tempting proposition to ʿAḍud al-Dawla than the East.

**Balance of power**

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The politico-military activities of the two powers in the strategic lands of al-Shām c. 367/977-8 - the time when `Aḍud al-Dawla made the preliminary overtures to al-`Azīz - clearly reveal that the balance of power was certainly in favour of the Fāṭimids. A few examples may be given to illustrate the point. By 368/978-9, Alptegin, a former mawla of the Būyids, who had earlier seized control of Damascus and had declared the khattaba there in the name of the `Abbāsid Caliph, withstanding all previous attempts by the Fāṭimids to oust him, had finally been defeated and won over by al-`Azīz. According to Ibn Khallikān, once Alptegin had established himself in Damascus, he sought the assistance of `Aḍud al-Dawla in attacking Egypt. He sent the following communication to the Būyid amīr: 'Syria is free [from the presence of foreign troops]. It is now within our grasp and the rule of the monarch of Egypt has ceased therein; aid me therefore with money and soldiers so that I may attack those people even in the seat of their power.' Nabia Abbott made some valid comments on this request of Alptegin: 'Aḍud, in these critical years [365-7/975-7 ] of Būyid history, coupled perhaps with mistrust of Aftakīn discouraged the idea ...' Consequently, `Aḍud al-Dawla replied as follows: 'Thy power has misled thee, and the result of that undertaking would be thy disgrace; fear therefore the dishonour which may attend it. By this, perhaps, thou mayest be guided.'

Qassām succeeded Alptegin in ruling Damascus. Though not a loyal supporter of the Fāṭimids, he nevertheless accepted the suzerainty of the Fāṭimid al-`Azīz and had the khattaba pronounced in his name. Meanwhile, al-Mufarrij b. Daghfāl b. al-Jarrāḥ had established his hold over al-Ramlā and its environs. He too paid nominal allegiance to al-`Azīz, during the period under discussion. Similar was the case with Abu Taghlib, the former ruler of Diyār Bakr, Diyār Rabī’a, and parts of the Jazīra. He had previously forged an alliance with `Aḍud al-Dawla but by this time had fallen out with the latter and had joined al-`Azīz’s camp instead. Ibn Miskawaih mentions an interesting tale of the manner in which `Aḍud al-Dawla attempted to dissuade the Fāṭimid al-`Azīz from assisting Abu Taghlib. Until the year 368/978-9 the Ḥamdānid ruler of Aleppo, Abu'1-Ma’ālī Sā’id al-Dawla, had also acknowledged the nominal suzerainty of the Fāṭimid sovereign over his domains.

The one group that had seriously challenged Fāṭimid authority and had been a constant source of anxiety to them was the Qarāmīta. They had joined Alptegin in fighting the Fāṭimid forces. They had also cooperated with `Aḍud al-Dawla in the latter's wars against the Būyid princes. After the joint defeat of Alptegin and the Qarmatian forces in 368/979, al-`Azīz managed to buy off the Qarmatians by giving them an annual pension. Consequently, at least during the reign of al-`Azīz, we do not hear of any serious hostilities from their side.

It emerges therefore that by 368/979 al-`Azīz had either managed to win over a number of forces that had previously opposed him or had at least neutralized them. This would explain why `Aḍud al-Dawla may have felt the need to initiate good relations with the Fāṭimids.

The Byzantine angle

The other possible reason for the negotiations may be sought in the relations of the two powers with Byzantium. The one common professed goal of the Fāṭimids and the Būyids was to wage a jihād against the Byzantines. The need to do so became particularly...
imperative for al-ʿAzīz and ʿAḍud al-Dawla because of the aggressive policy that the Byzantine rulers pursued against the dār al-īslām in the tenth century - especially in the territories of al-Shām. As can be ascertained from the correspondence exchanged between the two rulers, the subject of jihād comprised an important part of the negotiations. There is a possibility that fighting against a common enemy, the Byzantines, would have contributed to the joining of forces of the two Shīʿī powers - at least temporarily - had it not been for the sudden change in the balance of power c. 369-70/979-80.

The defeat of Bardas Skleros

The one major factor that tipped the scales of power in favour of the Būyids was the crushing of the rebellion of Bardas Skleros in 369/979 by the forces of the Byzantine emperor. Skleros had been the chief lieutenant and a brother-in-law of John Tzimiskes - the previous Byzantine emperor. On the latter’s death Skleros himself aspired to the imperial crown. When he was thwarted in his attempts, he rebelled. After his defeat Skleros appealed for assistance to ʿAḍud al-Dawla. In return he pledged allegiance to the Būyid amīr. He also promised to hand over to the Būyids all the fortresses at the ṭūghūr that had earlier been under Muslim control but which had subsequently been seized by the Byzantine forces.

The presence of Bardas Skleros at the Būyid court transformed the hitherto hostile attitude of the Byzantines into seeking a pact with the Būyids. Al-Rudhrāwārī gives a graphic account of the Byzantine envoy and the representative of Skleros vying with each other in their promises to ʿAḍud al-Dawla. Clearly the main aim of the Byzantines in undertaking these negotiations was the handing over of Skleros to Byzantium. ʿAḍud al-Dawla was thus presented with an opportunity to achieve by way of diplomacy what would otherwise have necessitated confrontation. As time elapsed, he increased his demands, using Skleros as a bait. Agreements were on the verge of being concluded between the Būyids and the Byzantines when ʿAḍud al-Dawla died in 372/983.

Meanwhile Būyid influence was in the ascendant in al-Shām. The Būyid amīr succeeded in 369/979 in getting rid of Abū Taghlib through the services of al-Mufarrij b. al-Jarrāḥ - who had by now been won over to the Būyid side. Consequently, he rebelled openly against the Fāṭimids in 370/980-1. Moreover, by 371/982-3 ʿAḍud al-Dawla was able to diffuse and defeat the syndicate formed against him by his brother Fakhr al-Dawla.

To conclude, it appears that for a short period of time, the two most powerful of the Muslim rulers of the late tenth century had chosen the path of negotiation rather than confrontation. However, within a couple of years after these diplomatic contacts began, they were brought to a standstill. The major reason for that would seem to have been the rising politico-military authority of ʿAḍud al-Dawla. Thereafter he may not have felt the need to pursue further diplomatic contacts with the Fāṭimids. As the Būyid amīr had initiated these negotiations in the first place, he was probably the one who terminated them. Had these negotiations been consolidated into an alliance, however, it would have had a substantial

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impact on the subsequent course of events. It would also have been a unique occasion in the history of Fāṭimid-Būyid diplomacy. However, that was not to be.
2 Sibt b. al-Jawzū, *Mīrāṯ al-zamān*. Reproduced in Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhail ta’rikh Dimashq*, ed. H. F. Amedroz (Leiden, 1909), 24-5, note 1. It has also been partially preserved in Ibn Zāfīr’s *Kitāb akhkār al-duwal al-mungatī‘a*; the part dealing with the Fāṭimids has been edited by A. Ferré (Cairo, 1972), 33-4. As C. Cahen (’Une Correspondance Būyide inédite’, *Studi Orientalistici in onore di Giorgio Levi Della Vida* (Rome 1956), i. 91-2) has pointed out, the common source of information of all the above historians is Hilāl al-Sāḥīb.

3 Ibn Taghrid Birdi, op. cit. ii. 13-14
4 Clearly this cannot be the central Iraqi Hīrā as this was largely deserted by the fourth/tenth century (see I. Shahīd, *E†* iii. 262-3). It may be a common noun, ‘the army camp’, or perhaps a place on the Byzantine-Muslim frontiers (i.e. the thughūrīr) in northern Syria or the Jazīra. For a detailed study of the thughūrīr at this time see M. Canard, *La Dynastie des H’amdânides de Jazīra et de Syrie* (Paris, 1953), i. 241-86.
6 Ibn Taghrid Birdi, op. cit. ii. 13-14.
7 ’Une Correspondance’, 93-5. These kinds of memos are an extremely useful source of information on the official policy of the government at the time. Unfortunately, very few of them are extant.
8 Ibid. 94.
10 ’Une Correspondance’, 95
12 H. Büsse, *Chalif und Grosskönig die Būyiden im Iraq* - 94501055 (Beirut, 1969), 55

However, as W. Madelung, ‘The Assumption of the Title shāhanshāh by the Būyids and the Reign of the Daylam ([dawlat al-Daylam]’), *JNES* 18 (1969), has pointed out, according to the more authentic report of Hilāl al-Sāḥīb, *Rūṣūm dār al-Khilāfā*, ed. M. Awwad (Baghdad, 1964), the coronation ceremony took place two years earlier, in 367/977-8. The Fāṭimid envoy could not have been present at the ceremony. Therefore the case that Arnold and Kabir make out for the Fāṭimid envoy being present at the coronation ’to form a high opinion of the

* I would like to thank Dr Carole Hillenbrand, Reader in Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Edinburgh, for her valuable comments on this article

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Caliph and himself [i.e. 'Adud al-Dawla] so that any pretension on the part of the Fāṭimid ruler to rival the eastern Caliphate in pomp and grandeur be nullified' (Kabir, 31), is baseless.

15 Ibn Zāfir, op. cit. 35. For the eruption of hostilities between 'Adud al-Dawla and his brother Fakhr al-Dawla see al-Rudhrāwī, Dhai'il kutāb ta'jārib al-umām, ed. H. F. Amedroz and D. S. Margoliouth (London, 1921), iii. 15-17; Eng. trans. Continuation of the Experience of Nations, by D. S. Margoliouth (Oxford, 1921), vi. 8-11; Ibn al-Athīr, op. cit. viii. 519-21
17 On the views of kingship held by 'Adud al-Dawla, his pretensions to royalty, and the various measures he undertook to achieve this end see Madelung, op. cit. 99-108; Būsās, 'The Revival', 57-69.
18 Al-Rudhrāwī, op. cit. iii. 60-4; vi. 59-64.
19 The issue of whether the Fāṭimids were the true descendants of the sixth Shi‘ī Imām Ja‘far al-Sādiq through his son Ismā‘īl has been a matter of endless debate. For a detailed discussion on the matter see M. Canard, 'Fāṭimids', EI², ii.850-2 and his references.
20 Ibn Zāfir, al-Dawal', 34-5.
21 On the religious affiliations of the Būyids see C. Cahen, 'Būyids', EI² 1350-7
24 'Adud al-Dawla was by no means the first Būyid amīr to curtail drastically the powers of the 'Abbāsid Caliph. He was, however, most successful at it. Cf., for instance, the manner in which Mu‘izz al-Dawla had the 'Abbāsid Caliph al-Mustakfl dragged from his throne. Ibn Miskawaih, op. cit. ii. 86-7; v. 89-90.
26 Ibn Taghīrī Birīf, op. cit. ii. 13-14
27 Hilāl al-Ṣābi as quoted by Cahen, 'Une Correspondance', 91-2
28 Ibn Miskawaih, op. cit. ii. 412; v. 451
29 Ibid. ii. 409; v. 488
30 Cahen, 'Būyids', 1355
32 B. Lewis, 'Government, Society and Economic Life under the 'Abbāsids and the Fāṭimids', Cambridge Medieval History, iv, ed. J. M. Hussey (Cambridge, 1966), 648. Ashtor, op. cit. 195-201. Although Ashtor (203) correctly points out that Syria did not benefit commercially as much as Egypt did under the Fāṭimids, nevertheless it is evident from what he states earlier that some of the coastal towns of Syria profited considerably from the lively trade activities sponsored by the Fāṭimids. Some towns of northern Syria such as Homs and Aleppo were also important centres of trade with Byzantium.
33 Ibn Mishawaih, op. Cit.ii 323-37; v. 349-66. Refer to Bosworth, 'Military Organization under the Būyids of Persia and Iraq', Oriens, 18-19 (1965-6), and Būsās, Chalif und Gosskönig, for these military issues.
35 H. Būsās, 'Iran under the Būyids', Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge, 1975), 264
36 Ittiṣāl, i. 249-51; Dhai'il (Zakkar ed.), 21-37; al-Kāmil, viii. 483-7
37 Wafayāt, ii. 483. The same information is repeated by 'Imād al-Dīn Idrīsī in his 'Uyūn al-akhbār, v. 357
38 Abbott, op. Cit. 357
39 Wafayāt, ii. 483
40 Ittiṣāl, i. 249-51; Dhai'il (Zakkar ed.), 38-40; al-Kāmil, viii. 512-13
41 On al-Mufarrij see M. Canard, 'Djarrāhīds' (Zakkar ed.), 21-37; EI², ii. 482-4
42 Al-Kāmil, viii. 514; Tajārib, ii. 391-2; v. 429-30

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Al-Kāmil, viii. 487

For further information see Forsyth, op. Cit. 375-93

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That explains the minting of a coin at Palestine in ‘Aḍud al-Dawla’s name in 371/982 - the subject of N. Abbott's article, 'Two Buyid Coins.' On al-Mufarrīj’s hand in killing Aḥū Taghib see Forsyth, op. Cit. 398 and his references.

‘Aḍud al-Dawla’, EI² i. 211-12 Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Al-Nujūm al-zāhīra fi mulāk Miṣr wa’l-Qāhira, ed. W. Popper (Berkeley, 1909), ii. 14


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Ibid. 94.


‘Une Correspondence’, 95


H. Bussche, Chalif und Grosskönige die Būyūden in Iraq - 94501055 (Beirut, 1969), 55


Jarrett (Calcutta, 1881), 427. Thus they place the coronation ceremony of ‘Aḍud al-Dawla with the tying of two banners by the ‘Abbasid Caliph in the Būyid amīr’s honour as having taken place in the presence of the Fāṭimid envoy in 369/980.

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50 H. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates (London, 1986), 218


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